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NOTES
THE INDIANA MARKETABLE TITLE ACT OF 1963: A SURVEY
I. OBJECTIVES OF MARKETABLE TITLE LEGISLATION
The most commonly stated policy of marketable title acts is the re-
duction of the necessary period of title search, so that an abstract encom-
passing relatively few years is nevertheless adequate for a determination
of marketability.' Thus, the abstracter is spared many hours of laborious
record searching, and abstracts are shorter and perhaps less expensive to
prepare. A second frequently espoused policy of marketable title acts is
the simplification of title examination by requiring attorneys to be con-
cerned only with interests and encumbrances not extinguished by the acts.'
Thus, title examiners can ignore interests and encumbrances which are
barred by the acts but which would, in the absence of such legislation,
cloud titles. The extent to which these two objectives are realized de-
pends, of course, on whether a marketable title act fails to extinguish in-
terests which are too substantial to be ignored, for if the act fails to ex-
tinguish such interests, examiners still will have to consider the entire
abstract. A third policy of marketable title legislation is to enable per-
sons, whether or not they are involved in a land transaction,3 to rely on a
record chain of title in assuming that, with few exceptions, all interests
created before the record chain have been extinguished by the statute.
This is the express policy of the Indiana Marketable Title Act.4 How-
ever, it is imperative that the limitations of marketable title legislation
be understood. While its policy is to facilitate efficient land transactions
by extinguishing certain old interests and claims, it leaves unaffected all
interests and claims which have arisen at or after a certain point in time
1. SIMES & TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 297
(1960).
2. Id. at 293.
3. Although the act is designed primarily to facilitate land transactions, a party
not involved in a land sale could nevertheless rely on its protection, e.g., in a quiet title
action.
4. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1101-10 (Burns Supp. 1963).
This act shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of
simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely
on a record chain of title as described in section 1 [§ 56-1101] of this act, sub-
ject only to such limitations as appear in section 2 [§ 56-1102] of this act:
Provided, however, that nothing in this act shall be deemed to change the law
affecting the capacity to own land of a person claiming a marketable record
title under this act.
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designated by the key transaction known as the "root of title."' Thus, it
does not permit transactions creating these comparatively recent interests
to be omitted from abstracts. Controversies involving these interests
must be resolved without reliance on marketable title legislation. More-
over, it exempts from extinguishment certain important commercial in-
terests' which, although old, may still be viable. Occasionally it may
divest a claimant of his interest, but this is not its primary purpose. It is
principally intended to terminate those old interests appearing of record
which are not likely to be asserted but which by their very presence cloud
a title.7
II. HISTORY OF MARKETABLE TITLE LEGISLATION IN INDIANA
For more than two decades Indiana has attempted to facilitate effi-
cient land transactions by simplifying through legislation the record
search and examination necessary for a marketable title. A 1941 act per-
mitted a property owner to ignore defects, imperfections, or adverse
claims of record thirty-five years or more prior to the time at which he
desired to transfer or encumber property;' but it expressly excepted
vested rights and interests in persons under legal disability,9 since its
purpose was merely to cure formal record defects such as typographical
errors, variations in name, and faulty acknowledgments. 0 Because of its
severely limited scope, most members of the bar ignored the act, and its
effect on land title transactions consequently was negligible."
In 1947 a second act, billed as a "Fifty-Year Statute of Limitation,"
superseded the earlier legislation. 2 Its purpose was to simplify land title
transactions by terminating numerous interests which had been created
more than fifty years prior to the determination of a record title's mar-
ketability."8 The 1947 act, which sought to rectify its predecessor's in-
adequacies by extinguishing old vested property rights, granted no dis-
pensation to parties under legal disability and excepted from its opera-
tion only interests of lessors, mortgagees, and their successors and those
interests preserved by a notice filed for recording within the fifty-year
period and upon which actions had been commenced within one year after
5. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 68-71 infra.
7. SiMEs & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 4.
8. Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 141.
9. Ibid.
10. Indiana Legislation--1941, 17 IND. L.J. 176 (1941).
11. Indiana Legislatio--1947, 22 IND. L.J. 399, 401 (1947).
12. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193.
13. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193, § 9.
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filing.'4 But the 1947 act was not accepted by Indiana title examiners
with any more enthusiasm than its predecessor was. It suffered from
ambiguities, one of the major ones being that it did not operate against
"interests .. . inherent in the provisions and limitations contained in the
muniments of title of the record title owner."" Almost every interest
in a chain of title from the government patent forward was thought pre-
served.' In addition, its requirement that a claimant of an old interest
commence an action after filing notice raised grave and well-founded con-
stitutional objections.'
The 1963 Indiana Marketable Title Act, prepared under the auspices
of the Indiana State Bar Association and based upon the Model Market-
able Title Act, is a significant improvement in Indiana's legislative at-
tempts to simplify land title transactions. It does not except parties un-
der legal disability and limits the 1947 exception of interests inherent in
the muniments of the record owner's title 8 by negating all interests,
claims, and defects created prior to the owner's root of title'9 unless they
are saved by the timely filing of a preserving notice by or on behalf of a
claimant."° Equally important, the 1963 act eliminates the unreasonably
14. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193, §§ 2, 5, 7, 8. Instead of excepting from its operation
interests of parties under legal disability, the act provided for a person to act on behalf
of a party under legal disability to preserve the latter's interest.
15. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193 § 1.
16. Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 IowA L. Rav. 261,
274-75 (1962). The author continues, discussing the 1947 Indiana act: "If this is the
correct interpretation, then only defects, not interests, prior to the fifty-year period are
extinguished. In this, and various other features, an attempt was made to adhere much
too closely to principles of conventional statutes of limitation."
17. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193, §§ 2, 4. Although the constitutionality of this require-
ment was never put before the Indiana courts, a case in point is Murrison v. Fenster-
macher, 166 Kan. 568, 573, 203 P.2d 160 (1949), in which the applicable statute required
a claimant of an interest in land to commence an action within one year from the effec-
tive date of the statute in order to preserve his claim. In striking down the constitution-
ality of this requirement as a violation of due process the court quoted Dingey v. Paxton,
60 Miss. 1038, 1054 (1883):
The power of the legislature to prescribe within what reasonable time one
having a right of action shall proceed is unquestionable; but there is a wide dis-
tinction between that legislation which requires one having a mere right to sue to
pursue the right speedily, and that which creates the necessity for suit by con-
verting an estate in possession into a mere right of action, and then limits the
time in which suit can be brought. The mere designation of such an act as an act
of limitation does not make it such, for it is in its nature more than that. Its
operation is first to divest from the owner the constructive possession of his
property and to invest it in another, and in favor of the possession thus trans-
ferred to put in operation a statute of limitations for its ultimate and complete
protection.
18. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193, § 1. The language of this exception varies only slightly
in the 1963 act. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102 (Burns Supp. 1963).
19. See text accompanying note 32 infra. See also IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1106(e)
(Burns Supp. 1963).
20. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102 (Burns Supp. 1963). The act's definition of "mui-
ments" aids the proviso in extinguishing old interests by restricting "muniments" to
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burdensome requirement that claimants of old interests commence actions
within one year after filing notice of claim. It requires only the filing, by
or on behalf of a claimant, of notice, the effect of which is to require a
quiet title suit or other legal adjudication of interests of opposing claim-
ants. Neither the title, wording, or effect of the 1963 act is that of a
statute of limitations.
In the past, marketable title acts have raised constitutional issues be-
cause they operate retrospectively to extinguish the vested property rights
of individuals. But there now seems to be little question that such legis-
lation, properly drafted, transgresses no constitutional proscriptions. The
Model Act, after which the 1963 act was closely patterned, was drafted
by land legislation experts who had constitutionality uppermost in mind,
and all courts which have considered the matter have held that such legis-
lation is constitutional.
The Indiana act differs in one unique respect from the Model Act.
The draftsmen of the model marketable title legislation assumed that to
extinguish automatically the interests which at enactment fell within an
act's operation would be unreasonably harsh and thus unconstitutional.2
The Model Act, therefore, and the legislation of almost all other states
which have adopted similar statutes provide periods of grace after en-
actment during which such claimants may preserve their interests. 2
The 1963 Indiana act contains no such provision, and though at first glance
it may appear defective in this regard, such is not the case. The 1947 act
provided a one year period of grace for claimants who held fifty year or
older interests to record them and thereby prevent their destruction.24
Had the 1963 act prescribed the same, the 1947 act's period for recording
interests in practical effect would have been extended seventeen years.
Parties who should have recorded their interests in compliance with the
1947 act would have received a second chance to record, and the policy of
establishing secure titles which supported that legislation would have
been weakened to a degree.
mean records of title transactions occurring after the root of title. For definitions of
"muniments" and "root of title" see IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1108 (Burns Supp. 1963).
21. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) ; Tesdell v. Hanes,
248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957) ; Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299
N.W. 553 (1941).
22. In support of this assumption is Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883), which
requires that a reasonable time be given to a person to comply with a statute which
otherwise would divest him of an interest in land.
23. Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 185, 200
(1951), SIIES & TAyLOR, supra note 1, at 268.
24. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193 § 10, provided a one year period of grace for recording
claims to interests which would have been otherwise extinguished by the act. It further
provided that claimants to interests which would have been otherwise extinguished by the
act would be required to bring suits to preserve their interests on or before Jan. 21, 1948.
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It nevertheless would have been the better part of wisdom for the
drafters of the 1963 act to have included a period of grace. While the
1947 act excepted from its operation the interests of mortgagees or their
successors in interest under mortgages of more than fifty years,2" the
1963 act encompasses them if created prior to the claimant's root of title.2
Thus, a pre-root of title mortgagee or his successor is automatically di-
vested of his interest by the operation of the 1963 act without an oppor-
tunity to preserve it.27 This legislative oversight is not, however, of great
significance because not only can there be few if any outstanding mort-
gages of fifty or more years, but experience under marketable title legis-
lation is simply that interests of that vintage are rarely asserted. The
safest, most effective way for abstracters and title lawyers to remedy this
defect in the act is to treat all mortgagees' interests as though the act ex-
cepted them. In so doing, abstracters should include in the abstracts they
prepare all mortgages regardless of age, and lawyers should continue, as
in the past, to pass on mortgages appearing in abstracts solely on the basis
of whether they have been discharged.
III. BENEFITS OF THE ACT
Qualifying for Benefits
To claim the benefits of the statute and be considered the holder of
a marketable record title, the present holder of an interest in land is re-
quired by the act's first section to satisfy four conditions: he must (1) be
a person (2) who has an unbroken chain of record title for fifty years or
more (3) to any interest in land, (4) with nothing appearing of record
which purports to divest him of his interest.2" Whether these four condi-
tions are met in a given situation is not as easily determined as might be
imagined.
The word "person" is not defined in the statute, and its correct in-
terpretation significantly affects the act's scope. If "person" includes
only natural persons, of course no corporation, estate, trust, or other arti-
ficial being can avail itself of the act; but such is not the case. Indiana
case law repeatedly has affirmed that "person" is a generic term which
includes both natural and artificial persons, and the generic construction
must control when the context does not limit the term to natural persons
or when the generic construction best achieves the purpose of the statute.29
25. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193 § 8.
26. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1103 (Burns Supp. 1963).
27. Obviously, he would not have filed notice of his interest while the 1947 act was
in effect because it excepted his interest from its operation.
28. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1101, 1108(a) (Burns Supp. 1963).
29. Billings v. State, 107 Ind. 54, 6 N.E. 914 (1886); Heintz v. Muller, 19 Ind.
App. 240, 49 N.E. 293 (1898).
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Thus, the term is used in the act in its broadest sense.
The second prescription of the act's first section, that the "person"
asserting a marketable record title have an unbroken chain of title to the
interest for fifty years or more, requires that he be able to trace that in-
terest to a transaction recorded at least fifty years before the date at
which marketability is determined."0 The transaction can appear in any
of the official public records that affect title to land and can take the
form of a will or intestate proceeding, tax deed, trustee's, referee's,
guardian's or executor's deed, court decree, warranty or quitclaim deed,
or mortgage. It must show either a grant of the interest to the party
seeking the act's protection or, alternatively, to one from whom he ac-
quired the interest by one or more recorded title transactions. Thus, if
marketability is being determined in 1964, the party claiming a market-
able record title must trace his interest from a transaction recorded no
later than 1914 ;31 and this transaction becomes his "root of title."32  Only
by coincidence will a root of title have been of record for exactly fifty
years prior to the determination of marketability; it typically will have
been of record for a longer time. The 1963 Marketable Title Act is thus
quite unlike the 1947 Fifty Year Statute of Limitation, which conferred
a marketable record title on the owner with an unbroken chain of title
for fifty years, against whom no notice of claim had been filed.33 It is
conceivable that a party seeking the protection of the present act may have
to rely for a root of title on a title transaction recorded one hundred years
or more before the date of the determination of marketability. Thus,
Indiana attorneys no longer should waive defects simply because they are
fifty years old, unless they were created prior to the root of title and
never preserved, for the act does not affect post-root of title interests.3"
The third condition to the statute's operation is that the party seeking
its benefits own an interest in land. The marketable title act of one state
was construed to work only in favor of fee simple owners, a result which
obviously restricted its scope.33 It was to avoid this severe and undesir-
30. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1101 (Burns Supp. 1963).
31. It is important to note that the requirement is that this title transaction be of
record for at least fifty years prior to the determination of marketability. See IND. STAT.
ANN. § 56-1108(e) (Burns Supp. 1963) : "The effective date of the 'root of title' is the
date on which it is recorded." Thus, it is not enough that this title transaction may have
been executed at least fifty years prior to the determination of marketability if it has
not been of record for that length of time. In the example given in the text, a title
transaction executed in 1900 but not recorded until 1915 would not satisfy this require-
ment of the act.
32. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1108(e) (Burns Supp. 1963).
33. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193 § 5.
34. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102(d) (Bums Supp. 1963).
35. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
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able restriction that the Model Act and Indiana act were extended to in-
clude expressly "any interest in land," such as an easement, a profit, a
license, a life estate, a reversion, a remainder, and a conditional or deter-
minable fee and its attendant future interests, whether legal or equitable,
possessory or nonpossessory. 6  The Marketable Title Act is designed to
streamline title practices in every land transaction, regardless of the in-
terest involved."
Finally, there must be in the records no entry of a post-root of title
transaction which purports to divest the claim of the party seeking to
establish a marketable record title.3" Neither the Indiana act nor the
Model Act elucidates what recorded transactions the drafters envisaged
as "purporting to divest" others. Perhaps the most workable standard
yet suggested for delineating such transactions is that transactions ap-
pearing of record which, if taken at face value, warrant an inference that
the interest actually has been divested are transactions "purporting to di-
vest.'""o To illustrate, assume A conveys an interest in land to B, who
records in 1910, and that B is the last grantee in a regular chain of title.
Assume further a 1949 conveyance from X to Y of the same interest
previously conveyed to B by an instrument which falsely recites that B
died intestate and that X is his sole heir at law. The 1949 conveyance
standing alone warrants an inference that B's interest has terminated, and
B cannot thereafter claim the benefits of a statutory marketable record
title. To rectify the apparent break in his chain of title and come within
the M'arketable Title Act, B must cure his title by some means acceptable
to his transferee's attorney. In contrast, if the 1949 deed between X and
Y was silent as to B's death and X's heirship, it would not on its face war-
36. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1101 (Burns Supp. 1963). Although some of these in-
terests are preserved from extinguishment by the Marketable Title Act, IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 56-1106 (Burns Supp. 1963), and are interests to which a marketable record title is
subject, IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102 (Burns Supp. 1963), their owners may acquire mar-
ketable record titles to them. To avoid confusion in comprehending the scope of the
act, it is important to emphasize this distinction.
37. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1110 (Burns Supp. 1963). The marketable title acts of
several other states are not so broad in scope as the Indiana act. In Wichelman v. Mess-
ner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957), the court construed the Minnesota act to protect
only fee simple interests. Although both the Wisconsin and Iowa acts provide for filing
notice and thus preserving old interests other than fees simple, they do not specifically
protect them. See IowA CODE ANN. § 614.17 (1962) and Wis. STATS. ANN. § 330.15
(1958).
Like the Indiana Act, the Model Marketable Title Act and the remainder of the
state acts accord to the claimant of any interest in land a marketable record title if he so
qualifies. See MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1271 (1945); NEB. RV. STAT. § 76-288 (1958);
N.D. REV. CODE § 47-19-A-01 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE § 5301.48 (1962) ; S.D. CODE §
51.16 B 01 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-1 (1963) ; Model Marketable Title Act,
SIEs & TALOR, supra note 1, at 6.
38. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1101 (Burns Supp. 1963).
39. 35 MICH. STATE B.J. 9, 16 (1956).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
rant an inference that B's interest was divested.4" Such conveyance indi-
cates conflicting chains of title, but it neither recites nor implies that B
has been divested of his interest. Instead, it is simply a wild deed. This,
of course, does not mean that the attorney of B's transferee may ignore
the 1949 deed. It clouds B's title just as surely as though there were no
marketable title statute, and it must be removed in a manner satisfactory
to the examiner because the Marketable Title Act specifies that a mar-
ketable record title is subject to any interest arising out of a title trans-
action which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title from which the unbroken chain of record title is begun."
This admonition is to emphasize that a commercially marketable and
"marketable record title" are not synonymous,42 for the statute imparts
only partial marketability to a title by cleansing it of pre-root unpreserved
interests and defects. It does not, however, clear a title of post-root
claims, which because of their comparatively recent creation cloud a title's
commercial marketability even more than most pre-root claims.
Scope of Benefits
Once an interest-holder meets the four conditions, he is eligible to
claim the act's benefits. The scope of the statute is sweeping, and once
an interest is extinguished it can never be resurrected. With certain ex-
ceptions to be discussed later, the Marketable Title Act extinguishes:
All . . . interests, claims or charges, however denominated,
whether legal or equitable, present or future, whether such in-
terests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or
under a disability, whether such person is natural or corporate,
or is private or governmental.43
40. Ibid.
41. Ian. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102(d) (Burns Supp. 1963).
42. Bayse, supra note 16, at 267, states that "marketable title" has traditionally
meant a title "free of all reasonable doubt, one which a reasonable prudent person would
be willing to accept. Stated another way, a marketable title is one which does not con-
tain a defect, outstanding interest, or claim which may conceivably operate to defeat or
impair the owner's title." SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 1, discussing the Model Market-
able Title Act for which forty years is the minimum age for a transaction to be a root
of title, explains:
It should be noted at this point that the term marketable record title as used
in the act, and as defined in Section 8, does not mean a title which a vendee
under a land contract can be compelled to accept. It means simply that the
forty-year title extinguishes all prior interests, subject to a very few ex-
ceptions. It is true, if these prior interests are extinguished, the title will
generally be marketable in every sense of the word, but that does not neces-
sarily follow. All the statute says is that, subject to the exceptions and quali-
fications stated in Section 2, all interests prior to the beginning of the forty-
year period are extinguished. The qualifications stated in Section 2 may some-
times mean that the title is not really marketable from a commercial standpoint.
43. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1103 (Burns Supp. 1963).
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While the more inclusive a statute is, the more effective it is in facilitat-
ing land transactions, the scope of the Indiana act seems questionable in
one respect. With the exception of interests of the United States, it ex-
tinguishes all governmental interests, including interests of the state,
counties, and municipalities. Because the state and its subdivisions own
interests in massive areas of Indiana land in the form of parks, preserves,
recreational areas, highways and streets, and government structures, one
might wonder whether the act will be detrimental to the state itself. Al-
though the government can protect its interests in the same ways that
private citizens can, such action would impose large additional expenses
upon the taxpayers. This dismal result is unlikely, however. Only if
the state or its subdivisions have owned land since before the root of title
of anyone claiming against the state can this problem arise, because mar-
ketable record titles are subject to all interests arising out of post-root of
title transactions. Moreover, sections 2(d) and 4(b) of the act provide
that marketable record titles are subject to interests which have been con-
tinuously possessive for at least fifty years, and the key here is construc-
tive possession. Thus, if the state or its subdivision has owned land for
at least fifty years and satisfies section 4(b) in every other respect, the
fact that it has been in continuous possession of a portion of the land
would suffice for the requirement of continuous possession of the whole
tract.4 Undoubtedly, statutory clarity could have been achieved by sim-
ply excepting the interests of states and municipalities from the act's oper-
ation. Nevertheless, attorneys should require the inclusion in abstracts
of all governmental interests, including those of the United States. More-
over, unless so indicated by the record, they should not assume that these
interests have terminated.
IV. INTERESTS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY THE ACT
Preserving Notice
Section 2 of the act makes a marketable record title subject to those
interests preserved by the filing of proper notice.4" A claimant of a pre-
root interest in land may preserve it by filing notice within fifty years
after the effective date of recording of the root of title of the party who
would otherwise have a marketable record title.4" Assume, for example,
that in 1904 B records a fee simple determinable conveyance from A and
in 1914 conveys a fee simple absolute to C. C will have a marketable
record title to his fee in 1964 unless A files notice of his possibility of
44. Broker v. Scobey, 56 Ind. 588 (1877) ; Barber v. Barber, 21 Ind. 468 (1863).
45. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102(b) (Burns Supp. 1963).
46. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1104(a) (Burns Supp. 1963).
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reverter within the period between 1914, the date of C's root of title, and
1964. It must be emphasized that A is not required to file notice within
fifty years after his interest arose but rather within fifty years after C's
root of title.
The act increases its effectiveness by providing that the fifty-year
period is not suspended by legal disability nor by lack of knowledge ;47 but
at the same time it allows a representative of the claimant to file notice
in the claimant's behalf in two situations. It provides that a representa-
tive can file a preserving notice for claimants under a disability, unable
to protect their own claims, or of a class of uncertain identity.48 Al-
though a legislative saving for parties under legal disability is not required
to insure a statute's constitutionality,49 the inclusion of the provision for
filing on behalf of a claimant prevents the harsh result of the extinguish-
ment of interests held by parties personally unable to file. The second
situation in which a representative may file for the claimant is when sub-
division deeds impose substantially identical mutual land use restrictions
of continuing effect on all parcels within the plat. In such a case one
party may file notice of and preserve the restrictions for all the involved
owners.5" Each owner in that situation has an equitable interest in every
other subdivision parcel, and the failure of only a few owners to file pre-
serving notices could weaken substantially the total land use scheme. In
addition to preserving the original land use plan in its entirety, the provi-
sion permits the avoidance of an unnecessary multiplicity of filing.
The mechanics of filing a preserving notice are enunciated clearly
in the statute and are complied with easily. The party filing must present
a written and verified notice which states the name and address of the
claimant, sets forth the nature of the interest or claim alleged, and ac-
curately describes "in particular terms and not by general inclusion" the
land affected.5" The last requirement is unclear. Of course, a com-
monly accepted legal description offers the greatest assurance that notice
will be effective, and claimants should not be satisfied with less. How-
ever, the statute does permit notices of a claim founded on a recorded pre-
root legal instrument to describe the land just as did that instrument.
This provision might seem of questionable merit, since descriptions of
fifty or more years ago are often confusing and inaccurate, but it assures
that filing notice, like recording deeds, is both simple and inexpensive. If
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883) ; Collier v. Smalty, 149 Iowa 231, 128
N.W. 396 (1910).
50. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1104(c) (Burns Supp. 1963). No provision of this type
appears in the Model Marketable Title Act.
51. IN . STAT. ANN. § 56-1105 (Burns Supp. 1963).
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the statute required claimants to incur the cost and trouble of a land sur-
vey before filing notice, the statutory procedure would be unreasonably
burdensome. In contrast to the 1947 statute,"2 the present act provides
for the filing of claims in a separate book-the notice index-with the
county recorder in the county where the land is located. 3 The wisdom of
this provision is apparent, for in localities without tract indexes it would
be exceedingly difficult for parties other than title companies or attorney-
abstracters, who glean the records frequently for additions to private tract
indexes, to locate preserving notices filed in a claimant's name among
the grantor-grantee or miscellaneous indexes. In providing for the in-
dexing of notices by real estate description rather than by grantee, the
1963 Marketable Title Act insures that the preserving notices can be
found quickly. Of course, the addition of a notice index to the records
affecting title to land requires an expanded title search, and abstracters'
certificates are now incomplete without a certification of a notice index
search under the description of the land involved. The greater speed
and efficiency in locating notices of claims, however, outweigh any addi-
tional burden placed on the abstracter by the necessity of an expanded
search.
Interests Inherent in Munimnents of a Title
The second section of the act also prescribes in part that marketable
record titles are subject to "all interests and defects which are inherent in
the muniments of which such chain of record title is formed" (that is, in
the recorded root and post-root transaction instruments) ." Assume, for
example, that a fee simple determinable is conveyed from A to B and
recorded in 1914. If no intervening transactions have occurred by 1964,
B has a marketable record title to his estate, but it is subject to A's pos-
sibility of reverter.2 The 1914 deed is both B's root of title and a mui-
ment in his chain; and because it creates a possibility of reverter, the
second section of the act subjects B's marketable record title to that in-
terest. Thus, the act does not operate to free an interest from limitations
placed of record at or after the root of title. Its policy is to clear the
record of old claims and interests only. By contrast, assume that a fee
52. Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 193.
53. IxD. STAT. ANN. § 56-1105 (Burns Supp. 1963).
54. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102(a) (Burns Supp. 1963). "Muniments means the
records of title transactions in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create the
interest in land claimed by such person and upon which he relies as a basis for the mar-
ketability of his title, commencing with the root of title and including all subsequent
transactions." IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1108(b) (Burns Supp. 1963).
55. If in Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957), the statute
covering old claims to land had contained this exception, the possibility of reverter held
by the court to be extinguished would have been preserved.
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simple determinable is conveyed from A to B, and the deed is recorded in
1902, and that in 1914 C records a fee simple absolute conveyance from
B in the same land. If no transactions or preserving notices are recorded
before 1964, C has a marketable record title to the parcel in question. In
this example the possibility of reverter has been created and recorded
prior to the root of title, and since it has not been preserved within fifty
years thereafter, it is extinguished."
In addition, the act specifies that a general reference in the muni-
ments to interests created prior to the root of title does not preserve
them." The importance of this proviso is illustrated by the 1941 Illinois
act, in which lack of such a provision raised serious questions about the
effectiveness of the act. There was speculation that a reference to an
old interest in an instrument within the seventy-five year period would
be the equivalent of filing a preserving notice. 9 The proviso in the Indi-
ana act prevents the inclusion of the familiar phrase, "subject to ease-
ments and use restrictions of record," used to protect the grantor on his
warranty of title, from saving pre-root of title interests from extinguish-
ment.
The proviso further specifies that only specific identification of the
recorded title transaction which created the interest preserves the interest.
However, what constitutes specific identification of an old recorded title
transaction is spelled out neither in the act nor in the case law. The pur-
pose of the proviso is to prevent vague, general references to pre-root of
title interests from preserving them and, as a side benefit, to prevent un-
necessary searches of the record for non-existent transactions. The policy
of the act is to encourage inclusion in the abstract of all matters pertain-
ing to the land placed of record subsequent to the root of title transac-
tion. It is consistent with this policy to include in the abstract pre-root
land transactions to which specific reference has been made in transac-
tions of record subsequent to the root transaction. The abstracter is not
burdened by having to search the record prior to the root of title since he
will have to do so anyway to include in the abstract records of other pre-
root interests to which a marketable record title is subject. According to
the policy of the proviso and the practicalities of abstracting, then, a ref-
erence to the original pre-root title transaction by the year of recording,
the names of the parties, or any other means of designation enabling the
56. Because "muniments" means records of title transactions beginning with and
after the root of title, the possibility of reverter reserved in the 1902 deed is not inherent
in the muniments of C's record chain of title.
57. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102(a) (Burns Supp. 1963).
58. Laws of Illinois, vol. 1, p. 854 (1941).
59. SImEs & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 331-32.
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abstracter to locate it should be specific enough identification to preserve
a pre-root of title interest.
Continuous Possession for Fifty Years
The Marketable Title Act specifies in section 4(b) that possession
of land is, in one unique circumstance, the equivalent of filing a notice of
claim. When a first party has been in continuous possession of land for
at least fifty years and no transaction appears of record in his title chain
during that period, if he is in possession when a second party asserts a
marketable record title to that land the first party is deemed to have filed
notice immediately before the second party's claim became a marketable
record title.0 To illustrate, assume that in 1904 A records a fee simple
absolute conveyance from B, and that A continuously possesses that land
from 1904 until 1964 without any transaction which affects his interest
appearing in his chain of title. If the records show a 1909 conveyance
from X to Y of a fee simple absolute in the same land, and in 1964 Y
asserts a marketable record title to the land, his title is subject to B's in-
terest, for notice of it is deemed to have been filed in 1959.
The theoretical necessity for this provision of the act is clear. A
party peaceably possessing land for many years will have no cause to
search the public records for adverse claims against his land, so it would
be unfair in that situation to grant a marketable record title to, for ex-
ample, a grantee under a "wild deed." Of course, because land today
commonly is sold at less than fifty year intervals, this provision will
rarely, if ever, be invoked, but legislation of this nature must anticipate
and provide for every eventuality, if it is to be trusted by its users. Fur-
thermore, it safely can be assumed that as to portions of land not in the
actual possession of the party, continuous constructive possession for at
least fifty years would satisfy the possession requirement of section
4(b).61
Adverse Possession and Use
Another type of interest to which a marketable record title is made
subject by section 2 is that of any adverse possessor or user, if the period
of such possession or use is entirely or partially subsequent to the effec-
tive date of the root of title. 2 To illustrate, assume that the statute of
60. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1104(b) (Bums Supp. 1963).
61. The doctrine of constructive possession is that when a party has title to land
and is in actual possession of only a portion of that land, the title to the whole places him
in constructive possession of that part which he does not actually possess. Broker v.
Scobey, 56 Ind. 58S (1877) ; Barber v. Barber, 21 Ind. 468 (1863).
62. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102(c) (Burns Supp. 1963).
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limitations for recovery of possession of land is ten years and that B has
a 1914 root of title. In 1918, X enters into adverse possession and stays
for the period of limitations, so that his adverse possession is entirely
subsequent to the effective date of B's root of title. In 1964, fifty years
after his root of title, B's marketable record title is subject to X's owner-
ship, which was not perfected until 1928. If in 1905 X entered into
adverse possession against A, and A transferred his fee to B in 1914, in
1964 B's marketable record title is subject to X's interest. There, the
period of adverse possession is partially subsequent to the root of title.
By contrast, if in the last example X had entered in 1894 and adversely
possessed for ten years, B's 1964 marketable record title would be free
of X's interest since the entire adverse possession preceded B's root of title.
This provision simply exempts recent adverse possession or use in-
terests from extinguishment by the statute. Again, it must be emphasized
that the purpose of the Marketable Title Act is to expedite land trans-
actions by disposing only of old claims to the land. However, it is also
the policy of the act that adverse claims arising after the root of title be
disposed of outside the scope of the act. The act is not a panacea de-
signed to eliminate all flaws in land titles. Moreover, if the act required
the statutory ten year period for possession or use to be totally subsequent
to the root of title, it would in effect extend the required period of pos-
session for those whose adverse claim had begun prior to an owner's root
of title."
Transactions Recorded Subsequent to the Root of Title
The act's second section further provides that a marketable record
title is subject to those interests which arise from a transaction recorded
subsequent to the claimant's root of title.64 It was indicated earlier that
when two independent chains of title exist in the same parcel, the trans-
action which appears most recently does not "purport to divest" the earlier
claimant of his title. Thus, if A conveys a fee to B which is recorded in
1910, and in 1918 D records a fee in the same land following a convey-
ance from C, D's interest does not purport to divest B's since the two
conveyances conflict. The act provides, however, that even though B was
not purportedly divested of his interest, the act will not confer on him
the benefit of a marketable record title. Thus, the recording of the sub-
sequent "wild" transaction operates in effect as the filing of a preserving
notice, and the commercial marketability of the claimant's title must be
63. The Indiana act specifies that it does not alter the time-period established by
any statute of limitations. See IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1107 (Burns Supp. 1963).
64. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1102(d) (Burns Supp. 1963).
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determined without the assistance of the act. The provision again plainly
illustrates the act's policy of clearing land titles of unpreserved ancient
claims and interests, while leaving unaffected those shown by the record
to exist subsequent to the root of title.
M iscellaiieous Initerests
In section 6, the Marketable Title Act excepts a number of interests
from its operation for commercial reasons. Among the excepted interests
are those of lease reversioners." The drafters of the Model Act made
this exception on the theory that a lessor, being out of possession, likely
would not be aware of adverse claims against his interest which the act
could otherwise divest. But this rationale applies to many non-commercial
as well as commercial future interest holders, such as reversioners after a
life estate and persons with rights of entry or possibilities of reverter
whose interests are not excepted in the Indiana act. Without a reason-
able basis for the discrimination, the exception perhaps could be assailed
on equal protection grounds, but the differentiation is justified. Long-
term leases are relatively common land transactions generally employed
to serve commercial interests, while non-commercial future interests have
declined in both incidence and importance. Legislative action which fully
protects the former from destruction by passing time and only condi-
tionally protects the latter does not seem invidious.
Unlike the Model Act, Indiana's statute subjects a marketable record
title to the interest of any lessee.66 This exception, which was engrafted
by legislators rather than the act's drafters, seems unnecessary, because
the lessee, unlike the long term lease reversioner, is generally in possession
of premises and thus is as likely as the fee simple owner to be cognizant of
adverse claims against his interest. Moreover, if the lessee has been in
continuous possession for fifty years, he is deemed to have preserved his
interest."7 Nor does the exception appear to serve any significant com-
mercial purpose. It is true that a commercial lessee might be out of pos-
session by virtue of having subleased his interest, but it would seem that
in that event he would be a lessor and thus protected by the act.6" Thus,
the exemption of old lessees' interests is superfluous.
The act also exempts from the filing requirement easements and
65. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1102(d), 1106 (Burns Supp. 1963). Thus, the rever-
sioner after a lease created prior to a root of title need not file notice to preserve his
claim.
66. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1102(d), 1106 (Burns Supp. 1963). This exception
means that a lessee whose rights arose prior to a root of title need not file notice to pre-
serve his claim.
67. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1104(b) (Burns Supp. 1963).
68. IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1106 (Burns Supp. 1963).
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similar interests, such as licenses, profits, and rights of way, whether
presently operative or reserved for future use, and whether or not ob-
servable.69 The draft of the Model Act received for action by the Indi-
ana legislature in the main excepted such interests" to relieve utility com-
panies, railroads, and other large easement holders of the burden of filing
preserving notices for the thousands of parcels in which they have in-
terests, but the exception applied only to those interests that were "clearly
observable." Despite the seemingly contradictory language in section 6,"'
the Indiana act excepts easement interests which are concealed as well as
those which are observable. Thus, under the Indiana act a marketable
record title vendee takes subject, for example, to the rights of owners of
invisible sewage, water, or gas pipes beneath his land as well as to the rights
of owners of the visible power lines above land and surface easements
reserved for future use regardless of their age. This extension of the
Model Act appears sound. Certainly the exception of all utility easement
holders is consistent with the act's policy of protecting important com-
mercial interests from extinguishment.
Section 6, however, specifically provides that unpreserved pre-root
equitable use restrictions on land are terminated by the operation of the
act. This provision raises the question of why the act excepts from its
operation non-commercial easements but applies to equitable use restric-
tions. Perhaps the best reason for the distinction is the different effect
on land use of an old, unused recorded easement from that of an old re-
strictive covenant of record. An old unused easement is less likely to
restrict the use of land than an old restrictive covenant is, for a restric-
tive covenant by definition restricts land use while an easement is restric-
tive only if it is exercised. This distinction seems weak, however; and in
the interest of clearing the record of old claims and defects, the legisla-
ture probably should have limited the exemption from filing to utility
easement holders and required filing to preserve non-utility easements as
well as restrictive covenants.
Additional interests which are not specifically excepted by the act
but to which a marketable record title is nevertheless subject are those of
the United States. Since a state's adverse possession statute does not bar
69. Ibid.
70. SlmEs & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 9.
71. See IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-1106 (Burns Supp. 1963). The section specifies that
an easement is excepted from the act if its existence "is evidenced by . . . [a] physical
facility and whether or not the existence of such facility is observable." Although it is
difficult to understand how an unobservable physical facility could be visual evidence of
an easement, the effect of the section is to except from the act's operation all easements,
whether observable or hidden.
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an interest of the United States, 2 it is highly improbable that a different
rule would obtain with respect to a state's marketable title act.
V. CONCLUSION
The Indiana Marketable Title Act does not guarantee a commercially
marketable title to a prospective grantor who has complied with the act,
nor was it intended to do so. The purpose of the act is simply to ex-
tinguish unpreserved pre-root of title interests which may cloud a title,
and its policy is to permit the settlement of opposing post-root of title in-
terests outside its scope.
The enactment of effective marketable title legislation is of great
significance for Indiana. "No other remedial legislation which has been
enacted or proposed in recent years for the improvement of conveyancing
offers as much as the [M]arketable [T]itle [A]ct. It may be regarded
as the keystone in the arch which constitutes the structure of a modern-
ized system of conveyancing."73  Depending primarily on two factors,
marketable title legislation may become as important in property law as
recording acts. The first of these is its success in facilitating land title
transactions through less expensive abstracting, more efficient title ex-
amination, and increased title security resulting from more uniform title
practices. If the Marketable Title Act achieves these objectives, it will
become an indispensable part of our property law. The second and most
important factor in determining the role of marketable title legislation in
Indiana is the extent to which it is accepted and used by practicing attor-
neys. Although problems necessitating changes in the act may arise,
they will be of no serious consequence if the bar continues to realize the
value of marketable title legislation while making the necessary changes.
However, if the bar reacts to these problems by throwing out the baby
with the bath water before the legislation has had a chance to prove itself,
inefficient conveyancing practices will continue.
DAMAGES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The National Labor Relations Board cannot award damages for un-
fair labor practices,' and the state and federal courts are severely limited
72. Northern Pacific Ry. v. McComas, 250 U.S. 387 (1919).
73. Sx Fs & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 3.
1. "The Labor Management Relations Act sets up no general compensatory pro-
cedure except in such minor supplementary ways as the reinstatement of wrongfully dis-
charged employees with back pay." United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656, 665 (1953). See also 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958);
Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
